This paper studies the effect of top managers on corporate financing decisions.
I. Introduction
When one CEO is replaced by another, the costs and benefits of corporate debt such as tax savings or deadweight costs of bankruptcy do not change. Accordingly top management change should have little effect on corporate leverage. Yet there is a growing literature claiming that CEOs are a key element for an understanding of firms (eg. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) , Cadenillas et al. (2004) , Malmendier and Tate (2005) , and the survey by Baker et al. (2007) ). How important is the CEO or the CFO for choosing leverage? Are differences among executives a first order concern for corporate leverage?
If a manager runs a firm for a long time, then a managerial fixed effect will be hard to tell apart from a firm fixed effect. If managers are optimally chosen by the board of directors, it is possible that the manager characteristics are intended to be well suited to firm characteristics. Worse still, we can only observe a subset of the characteristics that the board of directors observes. This makes it unlikely that managerial characteristics would be independent of the error term in a leverage regression.
To partly get around these problems we focus on corporate leverage and manager turnover events. 1 While there may be some change, the firm's basic characteristics and opportunities are not likely to be fundamentally changed around a turnover event. (A steel company does not suddenly become a biotechnology firm when a new CEO takes over the firm.) If the manager characteristics are unimportant then no change in leverage will be observed when the CEO changes. However, if managerial characteristics drive leverage choices, leverage might change after the turnover event.
We distinguish cases of routine turnover from cases of forced turnover. Routine turnovers typically happen when the executive reaches normal retirement age or leaves the firm because of health problems. Forced retirements are cases in which the manager seems to have been fired. Incoming CEOs should be optimally selected in 1 There are a number of previous studies of top manager turnover. For example, Denis and Denis (1995) and Huson et al. (2004) show that forced CEO replacements are often a result of poor operating performance. Much of the literature focuses on labor economics issues. Fee and Hadlock (2004) show that other executives are often replaced when an outside CEO is brought in. They also study the type of jobs that the displaced executives find. Parrino (1997) studies inside versus outside succession.
either case. Outgoing CEOs may have been fired due to suboptimal performance. 2 If the CEO was fired, then we expect the new CEO to try to fix things. If leverage is one of the things that needs fixing, we should see changes in leverage. If the CEO turnover was routine, then it is not clear that anything needs to be fixed and less change might be observed.
In addition to leverage, we also examine leverage adjustment speeds. Organizational politics may also play a role here. A new CEO may have an initial 'honeymoon' period during which it is easier to make changes. 3 Afterwards organizational inertia may tend to set in. This suggests that leverage should adjust more rapidly after a new CEO comes in. Offsetting this is the need for a new CEO to 'learn the ropes'. Thus an outside CEO might have a lagged adjustment relative to an inside CEO.
The evidence does support the idea that managerial behavior matters for corporate leverage. This shows up in several ways.
1. A CEO fixed effect plays a strong role in a leverage regression. The CEO effect and the firm fixed effect are empirically closely connected. Adding either to a leverage regression increases the explanatory power substantially. Adding a firm fixed effect to a leverage regression that includes a CEO effect adds less than a 1% improvement in the R 2 , while adding a CEO effect to a leverage regression that includes a firm fixed effect improves the R 2 by about 4.5%. Parallel effects are found in leverage adjustment models.
This finding potentially opens the door to an economic interpretation of the results in Lemmon et al. (2007) . They found that firm fixed effects dominate conventional leverage factors in their ability to account for cross-sectional differences in leverage.
Our results support their claims. They do not provide an economic interpretation of 2 Consistent with this idea we find that the characteristics and contracts given to the incoming CEOs are fairly similar in a forced turnover and in a routine turnover. In a forced turnover the departing CEO is generally more poorly paid than the incoming CEO. In a forced turnover the incoming CEO tends to have a slightly higher pay for performance contract than does the incoming CEO in a routine turnover.
3 For much the same reason it is common for newly elected politicians to attempt to affect change quickly. For instance think of the "first hundred hours" of the newly empowered Democrats in the US congress after the election of 2006. this fixed effect. Our evidence suggests that most of what they are finding probably reflects the effect of managerial behavior. 4 Further evidence of the importance of top management is found by looking at managerial turnovers. Typically when a manager is forced out, leverage has been above normal, particularly for the previous year or two. This is consistent with the idea that debt might have been accumulating due to poor corporate performance as shown by a number of papers including Denis and Denis (1995) and Huson et al. (2004) . The manager is replaced by the board in hopes of improved performance.
If the firm's performance has been satisfactory, and a turnover event is needed, it is likely to be a routine turnover rather than a forced turnover. Accordingly, it is interesting to find that firms with routine turnovers have faster target adjustment of leverage both before and after the turnover.
Additional evidence of the importance of managers can be found by looking at the impact of executive compensation on leverage adjustments. Higher pay for performance (Core and Guay, 2002) is associated with more rapid target adjustment behavior.
In other words, when the CEO's pay check is at stake the firm seems to adjust leverage more rapidly. When the CEO has less at stake, slower leverage adjustment is observed.
2. In an attempt to explore why managers make differing leverage choices we put a fair bit of effort into an attempt to document the impact of managerial characteristics on corporate leverage. Despite gathering considerable personal information about the executives, this proves problematic. The panel data set that we gathered is large enough that some statistically significant results are obtained. However these personal attributes have limited ability to explain differences in financing decisions across firms.
Leverage choices are not all that closely connected to readily observable managerial traits.
This could result from a fundamental disjunction between observable CEO characteristics and CEO preferences over corporate leverage. If so, then there is little more to be done beyond directly measuring the CEO's beliefs. An alternative possibility is 4 Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that differences in timing of security issuances have a persistent effect on a company's capital structure. But Lemmon et al. (2007) argue that capital structure differences are permanent rather than time varying. Our evidence suggests there may be a very natural reconciliation between the Baker and Wurgler (2002) and the Lemmon et al. (2007) results in terms of changes in top executives.
that the CEO fixed effect is actually serving as a proxy for something deeper and more complex than the personality of a single person. It is likely that the managerial team more broadly interpreted matters. (Fee and Hadlock, 2004) show that other top executives commonly change jobs at about the same time as the CEO. Hence the CEO fixed effect might be serving as a proxy for a deeper and more complex set of relationships among a group of top managers.
Such a hypothesis is inherently hard to measure. In order to get at it to some degree we tried introducing the CFO into the analysis. If the CEO fixed effect is really measuring the actions of the CEO then adding a CFO into the picture ought not to matter.
If however, leverage is chosen by more than just the CEO, then the CFO effect might improve the fit.
3. The CEO and the CFO fixed effects are closely connected. To the extent that we can tell them apart, it seems to be the CFO rather than the CEO that plays the more important role in determining corporate leverage. This shows up in several ways.
Leverage adjustment equations fit better when both fixed effects are included. The payfor-performance sensitivity of leverage adjustment is quite a bit greater for the CFO than it is for the CEO, and the CFO equations actually explain more of the variation in the data. It is not just the CEO that matters.
Our bottom line is that the behavior of the top executives really matters for corporate leverage. This is a first order effect. Some studies stress the impact of the CEO.
Given the high profile, and ready availability of data this emphasis is quite understandable. However, it may also be misleading. The CEO does not operate in a vacuum. It is not just the CEO who is driving capital structure decisions. The CFO also matters. In fact the CFO appears to matter more than does the CEO for how the firm is financed.
Given the job titles, perhaps that should not be too surprising.
II. Data Description
The sample consists of chief executive officers (CEOs) of S&P500, S&P MidCap400, and S&P SmallCap 600 firms listed in Standard and Poor's Execucomp database. The sample period is from 1993 to 2004. The financial data are from the Compustat files and are deflated to constant 2000 dollars using the GDP deflator. Financial firms, firms involved in major mergers (Compustat footnote code AB), and firms with missing book value of assets are excluded. The final sample has 16,929 observations on 2,248 firms and 3,898 CEOs. Appendix A describes the key variables with relevant Compustat data item numbers. The variables are winsorized at the 0.50% level in both tails to replace outliers and the most extremely misrecorded data.
Appendix A also reports descriptive statistics for the leverage ratio and leverage factors for the matched Execucomp-Compustat CEO sample. A comparison of these statistics with a broader Compustat sample reported in Frank and Goyal (2007) shows that Execucomp firms are relatively large, have higher profitability and collateral, and more frequently pay dividends. However, leverage ratios are not all that different.
III. Corporate Leverage and CEO Fixed Effects

A. Cross-sectional estimates
Let T DM i,t denote the market leverage ratio for firm i at time t. Let F irm/M anagerF E i denote the firm or manager fixed effect, as appropriate. Let F G i,t denote the seven conventional leverage factors as in Frank and Goyal (2007) . Then the regression is,
Column (1) of Table I reports estimates from leverage regressions for the Execucomp sample.
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The signs and statistical significance of the leverage factors is the same as in Frank and Goyal (2007) . Lemmon et al. (2007) have found that a firm's initial leverage is very important for determining its subsequent leverage. They report that this effect matters even decades later. In column (2), we therefore examine how important a firm's initial leverage is in determining leverage at any future point in time. . As reported by Lemmon et al. (2007) , the initial leverage is statistically significant. Leverage is persistent. However this does not have a large impact on the other factors, and it does not result in a huge improvement in the fraction of the variation accounted for.
In column (3), we introduce firm fixed effects into the analysis. Consistent with Lemmon et al. (2007) , the results show that the firm fixed effects account for a great deal of the variation in the data. The R 2 increases from 0.461 to 0.774. All of the coefficients on the conventional factors retain the same sign, and all remain statistically significant.
As might be expected, the firm fixed effect is much more powerful than the initial leverage. The financial interpretation of the firm fixed effect is not entirely clear.
Columns (1) through (3) show that our data provides results very similar to those reported in the previous literature. We therefore test for CEO effects by removing the firm fixed effect and instead including a CEO fixed effect.
If managers are unimportant, then column (4) should fit much worse than columns (2) and (3). In an extreme case one might even be back with a fit akin to column (1).
If managers are serving as noisy proxies for firm fixed effects, then the R 2 should be somewhere between the fit in column (1) and the fit in column (3). If, however, the firm fixed effect is serving as a noisy proxy for a CEO effect, then the R 2 in column (4) should exceed that in column (3).
The introduction of CEO fixed effects does prove to be important. The R 2 increases to 0.811. In most cases the coefficients on the individual factors are largely unaffected (except for dividends). The CEO effect is not just a noisy proxy for a firm effect. If anything the reverse seems to be true. When we add both types of fixed effects at the same time (column 5) the R 2 = 0.819, which is almost the same as when we have only the managerial fixed effects. From Table I we find that the firm fixed effect does not contain very much information that is not already contained in the CEO fixed effect.
B. Partial Adjustment Estimates with Manager Effects
A variety of studies have focused on leverage adjustments rather on leverage levels.
There has been a debate about how rapidly leverage converges towards the long run target. Flannery and Rangan (2006) show that including firm fixed effects significantly improves leverage adjustment speeds. The idea is that in a pooled regression it is inevitable that the target is measured with error. The firm fixed effect will improve on the estimated firm target and thus improve the estimate of the speed of adjustment. Column (1) reports estimates from pooled OLS and provide a benchmark for adjustment speeds in the absence of either firm-or manager-fixed effects. As found in previous studies such as Fama and French (2002) the coefficient on lagged leverage is fairly low (−0.150) . This has been interpreted to mean that firms adjust leverage extremely slowly ('a snail's pace'). Column (2) is similar except that we correct standard errors for clustering at the firm and year level.
Flannery and Rangan (2006) found that introduction of firm fixed effects lead to a significant increase in the estimated speed of leverage adjustment. Adding firm fixed effects substantially increases the adjustment speeds. In untabulated regressions we excluded that leverage factors and find that the coefficient on lagged leverage is about 0.41. In column (4) we introduce a firm fixed effect, and find the same result that they reported. There is a dramatic increase in the coefficient on lagged leverage (−0.458).
This is reassuring in that it means that our data is basically similar.
For completeness in column (3) we follow Lemmon et al. (2007) by including the initial leverage as a factor. It proves to have very little effect on the explanatory power and on the speed of adjustment. It seems that the adjustment is more a matter of last period's leverage rather than the distant past.
This positions us to examine the importance of the CEO effect relative to the firm effect. This is carried out in columns (5) and (6). In column (5), we include CEO fixed effects and find that it increases the adjustment speeds to about 55%. This is about 20%
(55% versus 46%) increase in relative terms. More importantly the amount of explained variation increases quite a bit. With neither a firm fixed effect, nor a CEO fixed effect (columns 1 and 2) a bit less than 11% of the variation is explained. Adding a CEO fixed effect increases this to 28.6%. In other words it more than doubles. Once again the firm fixed effect can explain some of the CEO fixed effect. Adding both fixed effects at the same time (column 6) increases the adjustment speeds to 57% and the R 2 to 0.302.
As in the cross section regressions, inclusion of a firm effect without the CEO effect improves the fit of the equation quite a bit. Once again the bulk of this improvement is accounted for by the CEO effect. Managers matter. Omitting managers from the analysis is potentially misleading. Omitting firm fixed effects also matters somewhat.
IV. Leverage around CEO turnover
The importance of the CEO effects must be driven by changes in CEO since for any given CEO the effect is a constant. Accordingly we now focus on the turnover process itself. We consider the role of forced turnovers when compared to normal turnovers, and also insider replacements versus outsider replacements. To do this we use dummy variables and their interaction effects.
We follow CEOs of firms in Execucomp during the 1993-2004 period and define CEO turnover as any change in the identity of the CEO. Of the 2,248 firms in the sample, 1,237 firms experienced at least one turnover. These 1,237 firms experienced a total of 1,885 CEO changes -764 firms had one CEO change, 331 firms had two changes, 115 firms had three changes, 21 firms had four changes and 6 firms had five changes. The annual CEO departure rate is a little over 11%, which is roughly consistent with that found in previous studies such as Denis and Denis (1995) and Weisbach (1988) .
For each of the 1,885 CEO changes, we search the Lexis/Nexis database for news articles describing the turnover. We could find news articles describing 1,755 of these changes. A full reading of these articles allows us to record the reason for the departure, the ages of both the departing and the incoming CEO, and the previous employment of the new CEO.
The departures are broadly classified as either normal or forced. In classifying these changes, we follow the criteria described in (Fee and Hadlock, 2004; Parrino, 1997; Huson et al., 2001; Lehn and Zhao, 2006; Kaplan and Minton, 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 2006) . Turnovers are classified as routine when the CEO (i) leaves the firm because of poor health or dies suddenly, (ii) has reached age 63 and is retiring following normal retirement policies, (iii) is less than 63 but a succession plan was in place for at least 6 months before the CEO departure date, and (iv) resigns but continues as chairman for at least a year following the resignation. Turnovers are classified as forced if (i) the departure is described as 'forced', 'ousted' or as a part of 'management shakeup', or if the CEO leaves because of a fraud or a scandal, policy differences with the board, or for poor performance, (ii) CEO is leaving the firm to pursue other interests or for personal reasons, (iii) the company provides no reason for the departure of a CEO less than 63 years old, and (iv) CEO leaves following a spinoff, asset sale, merger or other corporate restructuring transactions. We summarize the reasons for turnover in Appendix B.
In column (1) of Table III we see that leverage is not significantly different before and after a normal turnover. This is not too surprising. The results for forced turnovers are another matter entirely. Before a forced turnover, leverage is significantly elevated.
This is consistent with studies such as Huson et al. (2004) who show that poor firm performance can lead to a forced turnover. After a forced turnover leverage is not unusual.
In columns (2) and (3), we look at narrower definitions of forced turnovers. Column (2) defines forced turnovers excluding CEO changes because of mergers and corporate restructuring transactions. Column (3) uses a more restrictive definition of forced turnovers concentrating on the terminations only. These narrower definitions do not fundamentally affect our conclusions.
In column (4) we consider the distinction between insider and outsider replacements. When the turnover is routine, this distinction proves to be unimportant for leverage. When the turnover is forced, we find that leverage is again significantly elevated prior to turnover. However, when outsiders are brought in following a forced replacement, the new CEOs take the leverage back down to what would otherwise have been expected. When insiders replace outgoing CEOs in forced turnovers, leverage goes down, but not quite as strongly. They seem to leave the leverage a little bit elevated when compared to what would otherwise have been expected. So the distinc-tion between insider and outside replacements does some to matter, at least to some degree.
In Table IV , we consider the effect of managerial turnover on the speed of leverage adjustments. As might be expected from the previous table, when the turnover is routine, the speed of leverage adjustment do not differ significantly from firms experiencing no CEO changes. By contrast, we observe large increases in leverage adjustment speeds after forced turnover. Firms which experience forced turnover exhibit significantly slower leverage adjustment speeds. The estimates suggest that all else equal, firms with forced turnovers have adjustment speeds that are about 16% slower (49% versus 58% for no turnovers). Following the turnover, the adjustment speeds become normal.
The last column of Table IV show that adjustment speeds are slower than normal prior to forced turnovers regardless of whether the replacement is from inside the firm or from outside. The adjustment speeds increase to normal in both cases following the CEO change.
From Tables III and IV we learn that forced replacements of CEOs have materially different effects on leverage when compared to routine replacements. We also learn that insider replacements of CEOs are materially different from outsider replacements.
This serves to enhance our confidence in the importance of managers for corporate leverage choices.
V. Leverage and Incentives
Results in Section III show that manager fixed effects are important. But they cannot explain why. This is a hard thing to tie down. There is not much theory to guide us, We use information on managerial compensation contracts to construct proxies for managerial incentives. Following existing literature, incentives are measured as the change in CEO's firm-specific wealth for every one thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth. The higher the pay-performance sensitivity, the greater are the managerial incentives to increase firm value. Both stockholdings and option portfolios are used to estimate pay-performance sensitivities since Core and Guay (2002) and Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that incentives from stock and options grants and holdings are much greater than those provided by direct compensation in the form of salary and bonus.
The option pay-performance sensitivity is the change in the value of option portfolio for every $1000 increase in shareholder value. The stock pay-performance sensitivity is the change in the value of managerial stockholdings for every $1000 increase in shareholder value. An alternative measure of incentives from stockholdings is the fraction of shares owned by executives see (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Yermack, 1995) .
We value new option grants and option portfolios of unexercised exercisable and unexercised unexercisable options following Core and Guay (1998). Their method is relatively simple and they show that the method yields estimates of equity incentives that are unbiased and 99% correlated with values that would be obtained if the parameters of CEO's option portfolio were actually known. The procedures and data sources are described in Appendix C. The option portfolio sensitivities and stockholding sensitivities are combined to estimate total pay to performance sensitivities.
Appendix C provides summary statistics on total direct compensation, wealth gains on option and stock portfolios, and pay-performance sensitivities for the CEOs. The median annual flow compensation for CEOs is over $2 million consisting of $525 thousand in salary, $300 thousand in bonus, and about $640 thousand in option grants (valued using the Black and Scholes method). The rest comes from other compensation and long-term payouts. While the median wealth gains from both stock and option holdings are zero, the averages are quite large suggesting that some executives are paid very large amounts.
The descriptive statistics on pay-performance sensitivity suggest that stockholding provide much larger incentives compared to option holdings. The average stock pay-performance sensitivity is about $26 for every $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth while that from option holdings is about $7.7. The medians are considerably smaller.
The median stock and option pay-performance sensitivities are roughly $2.5 and $1.6, respectively. Together, stocks and option holdings increase CEO wealth by a median of $9.6 for every $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth. CEOs own a median of 0.36% stock (the average is about 3%). Table V examines the effect of incentives on the market leverage ratio. The model is essentially the same as in Table I . However the pay-for-performance factors are included. All of the regression estimates include firm and year fixed effects and report t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity. The coefficients on the standard factors are
A. Effect of incentives and ownership on leverage
very similar to what is reported in Table I , and so to save space those coefficients are not reported in the table.
In Table I we see that most of the effect of incentives on leverage ratios comes from option holdings. In column (3) we see that the coefficient on the total pay-toperformance sensitivity is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Managers who have high powered incentives seem to choose more conservative leverage.
Columns (1) and (2) show that much of the managerial effect is driven by the incentives provided by option holdings rather than by stocks.
In column (4), we directly examine if managerial stock ownership affects leverage.
Ownership is highly non-linear with a majority of executives owning small amounts of equity but a few who own substantial amounts. There is a large literature that argues that ownership has non-linear effects on firm performance with ownership providing incentives at low levels and entrenching managers at higher levels. The results reported in column (4) are consistent with this non-linear effect of ownership. At low leverage levels (managerial stockholdings < 1%), leverage declines as ownership increases. At intermediate ownership levels (between 1% and 5%), leverage is unrelated to ownership and at high ownership levels (more than 5%), leverage increases with ownership. The results in columns (1) to (3) show that CEO incentives have statistically significant and economically large effects on leverage adjustment speeds. Higher stock and option pay-performance sensitivities both significantly increase adjustment speeds.
B. Effect of incentives and ownership on adjustment speeds
The effect of option pay-performance sensitivity on leverage adjustment speeds is larger than the stock pay-performance sensitivity. So as in the results in Table I , we again find that the CEO behavioral response seems to be being driven by options.
In Column (4), we interact the ownership structure with lagged leverage to examine the effect of ownership on adjustment speeds. As before, we construct three different interaction terms to examine the non-linear effect of ownership on leverage adjustment speeds. The first interaction term multiplies ownership with lagged leverage for managers who own less that 1% of the equity in the firm. This interaction is zero for other managers. The second interaction term captures managerial ownership in the range of 1% to 5% while the last interaction term captures managerial ownership greater than 5%. CEO ownership does not have much of an effect on leverage adjustment speeds.
In summary, while incentive contracts for CEOs, particularly option-based incentives, do affect speed of leverage adjustment, CEO ownership does not.
VI. Manager Characteristics and Leverage
A number of behavioral finance studies have focused attention on the characteristics of managers (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Baker et al., 2007) . Perhaps the most striking observation in VII is the comparisons of the incentive packages. As a reflection of their time at the firm, outgoing CEOs commonly have more stockholdings and more options than do the incoming CEOs. Accordingly the pay-for-performance sensitivity typically drops dramatically when a CEO is replaced.
Presumably in an effort to mitigate this the Back-Scholes value of options given to the incoming CEO is typically larger than the value of the outgoing CEO. This effect is particularly strong when the incoming CEO is an outside replacement in a forced turnover.
How much of an effect do the CEO characteristics have on leverage? Table VIII presents the results. The strongest effect is found in the length of CEO tenure. The longer the CEO has been in charge, the lower the leverage. CEOs who have worked at more companies previously, have an MBA degree, or a law degree tend to have greater leverage. These effects are statistically significant and account for some variation in the data, but not all that much. 
VII. CFOs and leverage
The fact that CEO characteristics do not account for all that much of the variation in the data is worrying. Perhaps the effects that we have been attributing to the CEO are not truly determined by the CEO. Perhaps the CEO fixed effect is actually proxying for something else. But what could that be? Recall that Fee and Hadlock (2004) report that other executives are often replaced when an outside CEO is brought in. It is possible that leverage is actually being driven the Chief Financial Officer, and we then attribute this role to the CEO because they are correlated.
To test this idea, we identify finance officers from among the list of highest-paid executives reported in Execucomp (taken from a firm's proxy statements The total pay-performance sensitivity of CFOs is a median of $1.4 for every $1000 increase in shareholder wealth. This is much lower than $9.6 for the CEOs. These differences are consistent with Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) who argue that the level of responsibility determines the pay-performance sensitivity.
Compared to CEOs, the CFOs are younger (median CFO age is 49 years). The median CFO tenure with the firm is 5 years, which is considerably shorter than the median CEO tenure. The median CFO has been in the CFO position for 4 years. Almost all of them have a finance career (about 97 percent). In terms of education, about 54%
have an MBA and 27% have a degree in finance and accounting. CFOs own very little stock in their firms (a median of 0.04%). Over 5% of CFOs are females.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table X examine CFO fixed effects in leverage regressions.
In this sample, a cross-sectional leverage regressions with firm fixed effects has an The CFO is at least as important as the CEO for determining leverage.
Columns (5) to (8) 
VIII. Conclusion
Differences among CEOs are a first order concern for corporate leverage choices. It may help to provide an account for the persistence in leverage that has been stressed by Baker and Wurgler (2002) , Welch (2004) and by Lemmon et al. (2007) .
The CEOs compensation structure seems to affect the firm's leverage choices. When the CEO has higher pay-for-performance, their firm tends to have lower leverage.
Since our data is from 1993-2004 it may not be too surprising that the options granted to the CEO are of particular importance.
Beyond the direct compensation-based effects, understanding how and why dif- Total debt/book assets (TDA): the ratio of total debt (item 34, debt in current liabilities + item 9, long-term debt) to item 6, book assets.
Median industry leverage (IndustLev): the median of total debt to market value of assets by SIC code and by year. Industry is defined at the four-digit SIC code level.
Market to Book ratio (Mktbk):
the ratio of market value of assets (MVA) to Compustat item 6, assets. MVA is obtained as the sum of the market value of equity (item 199, price-close item 54, shares outstanding) + item 34, debt in current liabilities + item 9, long-term debt + item 10, preferred-liquidation value, -item 35, deferred taxes and investment tax credit.
Collateral (Colltrl):
the ratio of (Compustat item 3, inventory + item 8, net property, plant and equipment) to item 6, assets.
Profitability (Profit):
the ratio of Compustat item 13, operating income before depreciation, to item 6, assets.
Dividend Paying Dummy (Dividend): dummy variable that takes a value of one if item 21, common dividends, is positive and it is otherwise zero.
Log of Assets (Assets): the natural log of Compustat item 6, assets, where assets are deflated by the GDP deflator. Appendix B. CEO Changes CEO changes are broadly classified as normal or forced based on a reading of news articles describing the change.
Normal turnovers are:
• CEO changes due to poor-health/Death: CEO resigns because of poor health or CEO dies suddenly. N = 67 (3.6%)
• Normal retirement: CEO reaches retirement age (63 years or higher as stated in the company's normal retirement policy). N = 552 (29.3%)
• Resignation with succession in place: CEO resigns but the company has a succession policy in place announced three months prior to CEO departure. N = 170 (9%).
• CEO stays as chairman/executive following resignation: CEO resigns (not forced) but continues to remains as chairman of the board or as executive for at least one year following the resignation.
Forced turnovers are:
• Terminated: CEO is forced out or he/she leaves because of policy differences, or following disclosure of fraud, accounting irregularities or poor performance. N=313 (16.6%)
• Leaving to pursue other interests: CEO (age¡63 years) resigns for personal reasons or to pursue other interests. N=161 (8.5%).
• No reason provided: The news article describing the CEO change; Resigning abruptly without any reason and no succession plan is in place. (CEO is less than 63 years old). N=156 (8.3%). Even when a successor is announced, if the CEO is resigning and leaving in less than 3 months, it is classified as no reason provided. If the CEO reasons, but stays with the company as chairman for less than a year or if it cannot be determined how long he/she stayed, then we classify the turnover in this category.
• Corporate restructuring: CEO leaves following a merger, asset sale, spinoff or other restructuring transaction. N=70 (3.7%).
Appendix C. Compensation contracts Valuing newly granted options
Modified Black-Scholes option valuation method is used to value newly granted options. The inputs requires are obtained as follows:
• Option exercise price per share: Exercise price per share for newly granted options from ExecuComp (EXPRIC).
• Option maturity for newly granted options: Options are assumed to be granted on July 1st of the particular year. Option maturity is the time-span in years between the option expiration date (EXDATE) and option grant date, rounded to the nearest whole year.
• Risk-free rate: The risk-free rates corresponding to various option maturities are read-off the Treasury yield curve, constructed monthly from the historical interest rate provided by the Federal Reserve Statistical Release. 7 Yield on one-year bond is used for options maturing in one year; yield on two-year bonds is used for options maturing in two years; three year bond yield for options maturing in three years; five year bond yield for options maturing between four and five years; seven year bond yield for options maturing between six and eight years; 10 year bond yield for options maturing beyond nine years.
• Stock price per share at fiscal-year end: Fiscal-end closing stock price is from CRSP.
• Stock price volatility: Stock return volatility over a 60-month period obtained from ExecuComp (BS VOLAT).
• Dividend Yield: Average dividend yield over a three-year period obtained from ExecuComp (BS YIELD).
Valuing unexercised options
We follow Core and Guay (2002) approximation method to value unexercised options held by executives. The inputs are obtained as follows:
• Exercise price for unexercised options: To estimate the average exercise price for unexercised exercisable options, follow the two-step process in Core and Guay. First, compute the ratio of the realizable value of in-the-money exercisable options (INMONEX) and the number of unexercised exercisable options (UEXNUMEX). In the second step subtract this ratio from the fiscal year-end stock price. The resulting number is an estimate of the average exercise price for unexercised exercisable options held by executives. Similarly, an estimate of average exercise price of unexercised unexercisable options can be obtained by subtracting the ratio of (in-the-money unexercisable options (INMONUN) to the number of unexercised unexercisable options (UEXNUMUN)) from the fiscal yearend stock price.
• Option maturity for unexercised exercisable options: The maturity of unexercised exercisable options is assumed to be four years less than the average maturity of the new grants. In case no grants are made this year, it is set at 6 years. The maturity of unexercisable options is set at one less than the average maturity of the new grants. In case no grants are made this year, it is set at 9 years.
• Stock price, risk-free rate, dividend yield and volatility: These are obtained as above from CRSP and ExecuComp database.
Total flow compensation comprises of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black Scholes method described above), long-term incentive payout and all other total. It is estimated by adding Black-Scholes value of newly granted options to the difference in two ExecuComp variables (TDC1 -BLK VALU).
Wealth change from stock holdings:
The change in stock related wealth is estimated by multiplying the value of CEO/CFO stock holdings at time t-1 with stock returns (in %) during the year.
Wealth change from option holdings:
The change in option related wealth is estimated as the value of newly granted options plus the change in the value of unexercised options (both exercisable and unexercisable).
Pay-performance sensitivity:
The pay-for-performance sensitivity is the change in executive's firm specific wealth (from both options and stocks) for every one-thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth (measured by multiplying the beginning of year market value with the annual stock returns including distributions). The compounded annual returns are obtained by cumulating CRSP monthly stock returns with dividends for each firm during its fiscal year.
Descriptive statistics on compensation and pay-performance sensitivities for the CEOs.. (1)
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